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Autonomous Legged Underwater Vehicles (ALUVs) are inexpensive crab-like
robotic prototypes which will systematically hunt and neutralize mines en masse in
the very shallow water and the surf zone (VSW/SZ). With the advent of mine
proliferation and the focal shift ofmilitary power to the littorals ofthe world, ALUVs
have the potential to fill a critical need of the United States Navy and Marine Corps
mine countermeasure (MCM) forces.
Duplicating theMCM portion ofthe Kernel Blitz 95 exercise whenever feasible,
this thesis uses the Janus interactive combat wargaming simulation to model and
evaluate the effectiveness ofthe ALUV as a MCM. Three scenarios were developed:
an amphibious landing through a minefield using no clearing/breaching; an
amphibious landing through a minefield using current clearing/breaching techniques;
and an amphibious landing through a minefield using ALUVs as the
clearing/breaching method.
This thesis compares the three scenarios using landing force kills, cost analysis,
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the tactical effectiveness of the Autonomous
Legged Underwater Vehicle (ALUV) as a mine countermeasure in the very shallow water
(10 to 40 feet) and the surf zone (High Water Mark to 10 feet) relative to current Naval
Service - the Navy and Marine Corps - mine countermeasure capabilities for hunting and
neutralizing mines in these regions.
B. IMPORTANT NOTE
Throughout the pages that follow, numerous acronyms and abbreviations will be
introduced to condense the written text. Appendix A will make reading easier because it
presents a central listing of all acronyms and abbreviations. Take a moment to familiarize
yourself with its location.
C. MOTIVATION
Marines have been known to crawl and claw their way to the shore in amphibious
raids - kicking in the door, as they call it. But widespread use of offshore minefields has
produced a hazard that has hampered and, in some cases, prevented the Navy-Marine Corps
team from conducting amphibious operations of all types.
For example, Iraqi mines strewn throughout the Persian Gulf during the Gulf War
posed one of the greatest concerns to allied naval forces. Two United States warships struck
mines, damaging both and forcing one to be taken out of action [Ref. 1]. The USS Tripoli,
a helicopter assault ship, which ironically was the flagship for anti-mine operations, hit a
mine and suffered a 16 by 20 foot hole in her hull. Another vessel, the USS Princeton, an
AEGIS cruiser, set off an influence mine, damaging her propellers and causing a
considerable crack in her main deck. The influence mine did not cause a hole, but the
damage was so serious the ship had to be towed out of the area and was considered out of
action. As a result of these two incidents and because the entire gulf region was more
heavily mined than originally anticipated, allied forces determined it too risky to attempt an
amphibious landing in Kuwait. Fortunately the naval mines in the Persian Gulf were not a
show stopper in the GulfWar conflict. But the success ofthe United States and allied forces
in future conflicts may depend on the force's ability to operate in a maritime environment
that is heavily mined.
The Persian Gulf War served as a catalyst which caused the focus of naval power to
evolve from the open ocean strategies of the Cold War to the current strategic concept of
joint expeditionary operations along the world's littorals. The United States realized the
expanded potential ofthe naval mine to frustrate plans. Consequently, today's Naval Service
must have effective mine countermeasures to ensure that post-Cold War era operations can
be executed.
D. EVOLVING NAVAL CONCEPTS
1. Forward...From the Sea
The strategic concept and direction of the Naval Service outlined in the September
1992 white paper, titled "...From the Sea," and reaffirmed in its October 1994 companion
document, titled "Forward... From the Sea," provide compelling requirements for effective
and modem mine warfare forces. The Naval Service must be prepared to operate in distant
waters in the early stages of regional hostilities to enable the flow of land-based air and
ground forces into the theater of operations, as well as to protect vital follow-on sealift
required for delivery ofheavy equipment and sustainment of major forces. [Ref 2]
This combined Navy and Marine Corps strategic concept calls for a forward-deployed
naval force, maimed, equipped, and trained for combat. This force must provide the means
for sea-based reaction should deterrence fail and conflict erupt during a regional crisis. This
force, deployed for presence, expeditionary in nature, and reinforced in response to the
emerging crisis, must serve as the transition force as the land-based forces are brought
forward into theater. Called a Naval Expeditionary Force CNEF), this highly flexible force
must conduct a wide range of missions including early forcible entry to facilitate or enable
arrival of follow-on forces. [Ref. 3]
NEFs must achieve forcible entry by projecting Marine landing forces (LF) from the
sea to objectives ashore in a hostile environment. Marine LFs are composed of versatile,
rapidly expandable, and task organized combined arms units. A NEF must reach inland
rapidly, finding gaps in enemy coastal defenses or, if necessary, penetrating prepared beach
defenses. If it is necessary to go through prepared defenses, the NEF must perform the
myriad of tasks necessary to breach them in-stride. [Ref. 3]
2. Joint Littoral Warfare
The two documents mentioned in the previous section refocus naval strategy towards
power projection and naval presence in littoral or "near land" regions of the world. They
define littoral as comprising two segments of battlespace. The seaward segment is the
geographic area from the open ocean to the shore which must be controlled to support
operations ashore. The landward segment is the geographic area inland from the shore that
can be supported from the sea. [Ref. 3]
Operations in littoral regions are subject to two characterizations, not necessarily true
of open ocean operations, that pose varying technical and tactical challenges. First, the
littoral region is characterized by confined and congested water and air space occupied by
fiiends, adversaries, and neutrals, making identification of friend or foe profoundly difficult.
Secondly, it is characterized as an area where adversaries can concentrate and layer their
defenses. Included, among others, are mine and obstacle defenses which are germane to this
thesis. [Ref. 3]
National military strategy calls for joint operations to apply military power across the
spectrum of foreseeable situations, including regional conflicts [Ref. 3]. Out of such a
mandate arises the need for a force capable of conducting joint littoral warfare. Joint littoral
warfare is the tactical integration ofjoint and allied forces to influence, deter, contain, or
defeat a regional power through the projection of maritime power from the littoral area. It
relies heavily on the seamless transition of forces from the sea to the land, a transition that
requires a rapid defeat ofmine and obstacle threats by joint, integrated amphibious and mine
forces [Ref. 3].
3. Operational Maneuver From the Sea
Today's NEF must capitalize on its inherent power, speed, agility, flexibility,
mobility, and self-sustainment to project power ashore using the principles of maneuver
warfare. The adaptation of this warfare style and its principles to a maritime campaign is
termed "operational maneuver from the sea" or OMFTS. [Ref. 3]
The goal ofOMFTS is to seamlessly and continuously project combat power ashore,
ensuring the rapid attainment of campaign objectives. OMFTS represents not a single
technique but a philosophy and a guide for current and future power projection ashore.
OMFTS demands rapid and flexible means to break the cohesion and integration of enemy
defenses, mine and obstacle defenses included. If mine defenses cannot be avoided, their
neutralization is accomplished to avoid interruption of the seamless and continuous nature
of the operation. Thus, OMFTS places flexibility constraints on mine warfare operations to
assure the smooth transition offerees from sea to the objectives. [Ref. 3]
4. Over-the-Horizon Amphibious Operations
Integral to the concept of OMFTS is the concept of over-the-horizon (OTH)
amphibious operations which uses technology advances to improve the opportunity for
tactical surprise. An OTH operation is an amphibious assault initiated from beyond the
visible and radar horizon. [Ref. 3] Under the concept of OTH amphibious operations.
Landing Crafts Air Cushioned (LCACs) and Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs) deliver
the LF across the very shallow water and the surf zone (VSW/SZ).
To enhance such an operation, discovery of enemy weak points is desirable. SEAL
Survey Teams provide the current covert means of enemy weak point discovery in littoral
regions. Such covert operations expose the personnel involved to grave physical risks and
require an inordinate amount of time to complete. Technology advances may provide a
better approach to solving this problem, while limiting hazards to personnel and expediting
the overall discovery process. Although discovery of gaps in the enemy's mine and obstacle
defense is desirable, the in-stride breaching ofthose defenses to facilitate the surface assault
may be necessary.
5. In-Stride Mine and Obstacle Breaching
In-stride mine and obstacle breaching supports the rapid neutralization of mines and
obstacles necessary to make seamless joint littoral warfare, OMFTS, and OTH operations
possible. In-stride breaching requires mine and obstacle clearance or neutralization systems
which can be employed immediately preceding initial surface assault waves through the
VSW/SZ without impeding the progress of the landing. Effective in-stride breaching
eliminates delays that LPs often encounter and minimizes the potential for losing the element
of surprise. [Ref. 3] Current measures intended to facilitate in-stride breaching fall short
because they limit the element of surprise. Any technique or technological development that
promotes unobtrusive mine and obstacle clearing will find considerable utility.
E. THE LITTORAL MINE PROBLEM
1. Forcible Entry is tlie Law
The United States Naval Service is required by law to possess the capability to effect
a forcible entry onto a defended shore by means of amphibious assault. Current defense
plaiming guidance reaffirms the operational requirement for this capability. The global
maritime military strategy has evolved to focus on regional challenges with the complexities
of conducting military operations in littoral areas, the battlespace of amphibious operations.
An amphibious assault has as its goal the rapid build-up of combat power ashore, from an
initial level of zero, to fully coordinated striking power capable of successfully achieving
objectives ashore. It is a difficult mission and the littoral battlespace is a complex
environment. [Ref. 3]
Potential regional adversaries have developed sophisticated anti-landing doctrines
employing modem weapons and tactics. A key principle of OMFTS is the avoidance of
enemy defenses. However, the ability to breach coastal, anti-landing barriers consisting of
mines, obstacles, and covering fires, when avoidance is not possible, remains a critical
capability within forcible entry. [Ref. 3]
2. Mines in the Battlespace
Mines are cheap and available. It is wise to expect that every enemy will have the
resources to employ them, and that any coastal adversary will employ at least some as anti-
landing weapons. Even those foes without the capability to deploy extensive and
sophisticated maritime and littoral defensive fields will use mines as weapons of intimidation
and as a means to occupy the resources of a more powerful antagonist. [Ref. 4]
Good naval mines are moderately expensive, but against high value targets can be
especially cost effective. A prepared and determined foe can be expected to use them against
allied ports and shipping lanes, as well as in his own or captured territory. Because few
adversaries either expect or strongly desire to use extensive maneuver on the seas against the
United States, they can achieve effective battlespace dominance by restricting use of the
seaward approaches to theater littoral. This fact makes even crude maritime mining a
potentially effective weapon in the hands of foes. [Ref. 4]
The enemy makes extensive use ofmines and obstacles as counter-mobility weapons
in the areas of an anticipated landing. Mines and obstacle defenses are designed to thwart
littoral power projection by charmeling, blocking, or deflecting assault forces in order to
concentrate the battlespace; and to disrupt and delay the LP's operational tempo during
critical phases of the operation.
3. Inadequate Mine Countermeasures
Succinctly defined, mine countermeasures (MCM) include all methods for preventing
or reducing damage or danger from mines [Ref. 3] . Current MCM capabilities are limited
by inadequate integration of assets, minimal reconnaissance means (especially clandestine),
and operational pauses created by the slow, deliberate nature of MCM operations.
Specifically, the critical limitations are [Ref. 4]:
Current countermine capabilities cost the advantage of surprise and relative
operational speed. Limitations in clandestine reconnaissance and preparation "tip
our hand" early to the enemy. Limitations in capability to conduct truly rapid
breaching once beginning offensive operations cede additional tactical advantages
to the enemy.
Range limitations in ship to shore assets require that naval forces either launch
landing forces from close proximity to the beach, or land surface forces by LCAC
in an area which must be isolated sufficiently to allow for an extended build up
of maneuver forces in a beach area. This latter area may be far from critical
objectives and the vulnerabilities that joint littoral warfare seek to exploit.
Maneuver limitations in surface ship to shore assets limit the ability to exploit
gaps in the defense. Even when launched from close inshore, LPs are limited to
nearly linear movement until ashore. Utilizing only LCACs solves some of this
problem, but reintroduces the loss of tempo associated with the build up time
requirements in the beach area.
The result is that an enemy who can emplace mines in operationally significant
littoral locations has at least partially succeeded in his objectives.
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F. POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE LITTORAL MINE PROBLEM
1. Many-Robot MCM Approach
MCMs near coastlines, both before invasions and soon after, remains a difficult
problem for naval forces around the world. In order for an amphibious force to successfully
reach the shore, a breached lane 50 yards wide must be cleared through the VSW/SZ with
a high degree of reliability and in a limited amount of time. [Ref. 5] This situation is
complicated by the fact that small mines can be laid in large numbers, for example by air
drop. The situation is fiirther complicated by the harsh environment; particularly in the
VSW/SZ, many existing systems simply cannot ftinction. Not only is the water perilously
shallow in these regions, but acoustic noise and turbidity hamper mine detection. A possible
solution to this problem is to employ a large number of small, inexpensive, expendable
robotic units that crawl on the ocean bottom, hunting and neutralizing mines. Such a system
comprising a large number of identical and inexpensive vehicles is more robust than a system
that relies on a very few complex vehicles, as mission success is not impacted by the loss of
a reasonable percentage of units. Additionally, satisfactory area coverage can be
accomplished in part by the sheer number ofvehicles rather than a requirement of systematic,
thorough, time-consuming search [Ref. 5].
In many respects, MCM operations appears to be perfectly matched to the many-
robot systems concept [Ref. 6]:
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• The MCM environment is dangerous to humans; a robotic solution allows MCM
operators to be physically removed from the hazardous area.
• The MCM environment is also dangerous to machines; the use of multiple
inexpensive robotic search elements minimizes the cost of lost system assets, and
allows the mission to be performed by the remaining elements.
• One important MCM task is the destruction of mines; using very cheap,
deliberately expendable elements allows a one-element-per-mine approach.
• Many mines must be dealt with; the use ofmany robots allows these targets to be
prosecuted in parallel, rather than one at a time.
The many-robot approach promises improved mine detection and clearance
capabilities and becomes increasingly viable as continuing technological developments
provide these capabilities at ever decreasing costs.
2. Autonomous Legged Underwater Vehicles (ALUVs)
Funded by the Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Office of Naval
Research, Rockwell International, IS Robotics, and the University of California at Berkeley
are jointly developing Autonomous Legged Underwater Vehicles (ALUVs) for VSW/SZ
mine hunting and en masse neutralization [Ref. 7]. See Figure 1.
The ALUV pays tribute to a crustacean that thrives in the VSW/SZ. A crab scuttles
through the VSW/SZ on legs that can dig in when the waves get rough. The ALUV can also
weather severe surf, burying itself in the sand by vibrating its legs.
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Figure 1. Autonomous Legged Underwater Vehicle (ALUV)
What's more, legs are great structures to load with sensors, because they touch
whatever they walk on. When the ALUV chances upon a mine, it clings to its quarry and
then awaits a command from an operations center aboard a landing craft offshore. Once the
signal is given, each ALUV blows itself- and the mine - up. [Ref 7]
The ALUV is described in more detail in Chapter II, Section C, Subsection 7 of this
thesis. Reference 17 also contains a wealth of information on the ALUV.
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G. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Using the Janus(A), version 3.15, combat simulation computer model, the researcher
seeks to evaluate the tactical effectiveness of the ALUV as a MCM in a simulated littoral
region and to compare the ALUV to current Naval Service littoral MCM capabilities.
Written in FORTRAN and adapted for use with the UNIX operating system, Janus
is a high resolution, interactive, two-sided, closed, stochastic, ground combat simulation
[Ref. 8]. This high resolution model allows the user to create units as small as individual
infantry and vehicular weapon systems and place these systems in ground combat scenarios
where the focus of the simulation is on the maneuver of the systems either individually or
as elements of larger units. The scenarios developed are two-sided, placing two forces. Blue
and Red, in opposition to each other. The simulation is closed so that the disposition of one
opposing force is unknown to the other until force locations are disclosed through direct
observation and contact or through intelligence reports generated by friendly forces. It is
interactive because it allows the user to make changes in the scenario as events unfold
without stopping the simulation. Finally, stochastic refers to the way the system determines
the result of actions like direct fire engagements or minefield crossing events: according to




This thesis is organized into four chapters, including this Introduction. Chapter II
addresses model assumptions and describes the development of the three Janus scenarios
used in this thesis. Chapter III presents a statistical analysis of the numerical data results
obtained from the scenarios. Chapter IV gives a summary of the conclusions and




Under mellow sunshine and a balmy climate along the southern California coast,
there is a vast expanse of hills and valleys known as Camp Pendleton. Named in honor of
Major General Joseph H. Pendleton who pioneered Marine Corps activities in the southern
California area during his 46 years of distinguished service, Camp Pendleton has developed
into the Corps' largest amphibious assault training facility. Purchased by the government in
1942 at a cost of $4,239,062, this 125,000 acres of real estate and accompanying 17 miles
ofprime coastline is now populated by more than 34,000 Marines and sailors and provides
training facilities for many active and Reserve Marine, Army, and Navy units [Ref. 10]. It
is here that the Navy and Marine Corps join forces to conduct a biennial training exercise
dubbed Kernel Blitz.
B. KERNEL BLITZ
The objective of the Kernel Blitz exercise is to improve the ability of a NEF to
operate effectively, as a total force, in a littoral environment [Ref. 11]. The exercise provides
an excellent opportunity to showcase amphibious and expeditionary force training
emphasizing "Forward...From The Sea" strategy and littoral warfare missions. Canada,
Belgium, Holland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Korea are but a few of the
countries that send official representatives to observe the exercise. Kernel Blitz is an
umbrella exercise that contains a series of subordinate exercises intended to [Ref. 11]:
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• Demonstrate the scope and flexibility of projecting combat power ashore under
realistic hostile conditions by conducting a large scale amphibious landing.
• Demonstrate the unique capability of Navy medicine to support expeditionary
forces in a hostile environment, including triage, medical evacuation, and afloat
medical care.
• Demonstrate current capabilities and new initiatives in the area ofMCMs.
• Demonstrate current capabilities and potential usefulness of wargaming and
simulation technologies to enhance the training ofNavy and Marine Corps forces.
The scenarios contained within this thesis duplicate, whenever possible, the efforts
of the forces involved in the Kernel Blitz 95 exercise as outlined in Reference 15.
Furthermore, the author has concentrated the combat modeling and simulation effort only
on the MCM portion of the exercise.
C. JANUS SCENARIOS
1. Introduction
This section contains a specific explanation of the development of the amphibious
combat operation for this thesis. Following the overview, the map and scenario weather data
sources are briefly discussed. The defensive minefield structure is then outlined in some
detail, followed by the force structure ofthe offensive force. The offensive force is presented
in three distinct scenarios.
16
2. Overview
OTH operations call for an approximate 20 nautical mile distance from ship to shore;
however, the defensive force's ability to detect, target, and attack the LF is the key
determinant ofthe OTH distance. As the LF assault unfolds, the defensive force's abilities
often become degraded to a point where OTH operations can be conducted at distances much
closer than 20 nm. [Ref 12] The scenarios contained herein assume that the OTH operation
is conducted at 1200 hours, at low tide, from a distance of 20 nm from the Camp Pendleton
coastline. What's more, it is assumed that the LF (Blue Janus Force) goes undetected by the
defensive force (Red Janus Force) ashore because the LF commander has maneuvered his
LF to Red Beach, a strike location that is neither anticipated nor discovered by the defending
force. The LF does encounter one problem, a littoral minefield in the VSW/SZ. The author
realizes that rarely will a LF go undetected and that minefields almost always are covered
by direct fire weapons, but to concentrate the modeling effort on LF versus minefield, the
author has made these assumptions. Figure 2
,
an adapted version of a diagram in Reference
12, gives a panoramic view of the amphibious objective area (AOA).
3. Camp Pendleton Map and Weather
The modeled scenarios use digitized terrain of Camp Pendleton developed from
Defense Mapping Agency data, displaying it in a form familiar to military users with terrain
contour lines, roads, rivers, vegetation, and urban areas [Ref. 9]. Janus additionally
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Figure 2. Overview ofAmphibious Objective Area off the Coast ofRed Beach
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visibility, and target acquisition of the systems developed within Janus. Therefore, as in real
life, these considerations must be taken into account w^hen planning a Janus scenario. An
image of the Janus representation of Camp Pendleton is contained in Appendix B.
4. Mines, Minefields, and Densities
a. Mine Types and Employment Depths
Naval mines are developed for specific purposes and can be used to
complicate all phases of an amphibious warfare operation, including its supporting MCM
operations. Laying large minefields that are effective requires placing mines in a linear
fashion of some sort to reduce the possibility of gaps [Ref. 13]. The defensive force in this
thesis employs a three layer linear minefield defense consisting of pressure mines in the SZ,
tilt-rod mines in the VSW/SZ, and magnetic influence mines in the VSW. An influence
mine is a mine actuated by the effect of a target on some physical condition in the vicinity
of the mine or on radiations emanating from the mine. A tilt-rod mine is an anti-landing
mine actuated by direct pressure against a rod causing it to tilt to a set limit. A pressure mine
has circuits which respond to the direct pressure or the hydrodynamic field of a target. [Ref
12] Water depth was used as a context for categorizing the types of mines laid in particular
regions. The mines were laid in a linear fashion, and the corresponding mine types and











Figure 3. VSW and SZ Mines by Depth
b. Janus Minefields
Janus simulates five types of minefields: hand emplaced, ground vehicle
emplaced, artillery emplaced, helicopter emplaced, and a manually operated portable
minefield. Only one type of mine can be specified for each type of minefield. The Janus
code allows for a maximum of fifty minefields, provided the total number of mines does not
exceed forty thousand. [Ref 8] By adjusting the data base probabilities associated with each
mine type, a Janus user can model various types of land and naval mines. In the scenarios
developed for this thesis, the hand emplaced (HAND EMP) mine type represents magnetic
influence mines (MGM), the ground vehicle emplaced (MECH-1) mine type represents tilt-
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rod mines (T-RM), and the helicopter emplaced (MECH-2) mine type represents pressure
mines (PM). The placement of mines within a minefield is randomly generated by the
computer each time a scenario is run.
A single HAND EMP minefield consists of99 mines placed regularly in a 50
by 100 meter rectangle. The mines within this minefield are located in three strips of 33
mines each. The three strips are 1 5 meters apart. Within a single strip, the mines are placed
every 3 meters, alternating on either side ofan imaginary line which bisects the strip. HAND
EMP minefields are located and emplaced by the user during the initial planning of a
scenario. Once in place, the user can execute multiple runs of a scenario without altering the
placement ofHAND EMP minefields. The number ofHAND EMP minefields is generated
by entering the desired number ofHAND EMP minefields into the Mine Type 1 field on
Janus screen III.
MECH-1 emplaced minefields consist ofmines that are uniformly distributed
in both length and width within a rectangular area. The density of mines dispensed is
selected by the user as either low (40 mines), medium (80 mines), or high (160 mines).
Although the length and width of this minefield can be altered, the number ofmines is hard-
coded. MECH-1 minefields are positioned and oriented by the user during scenario initial
planning or during scenario execution. The number ofMECH-1 minefields is generated by
entering the desired number of MECH-1 minefields into the Mine Type 2 field on Janus
screen III.
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The MECH-2 minefield is positioned and oriented by preplanning a helicopter
movement route over the minefield site and dropping the MECH-2 minefield at the desired
location. The user decides when to drop each minefield fi-om the helicopter and executes a
drop interactively with a computer mouse. The mines within the MECH-2 minefields are
randomly but uniformly distributed within the minefield dimensions. The densities are
selected in the same way as that ofMECH-1
.
Minefield classifications are defined by the user within the Combat Systems
Data Base, as are each system's vulnerability to each minefield type. The assignment of a
breaching capability to an individual system is made within the Force Definition File of
Janus. However, the effectiveness of each breaching method (e.g., plow, roller, line charge)
is assigned within the Combat Systems Data Base. Each breaching method is assigned a
survival probability specifying the likelihood that a MCM system will survive given that it
encounters a minefield. For example, a mine breaching plow attached to a tank may be
assigned a 79 percent chance of successfiilly neutralizing an influence mine (method
effectiveness), but only a 75 percent chance ofsurviving given that it encounters an influence
mine (method survivability). [Ref 14]
Each system created in Janus is assigned minefield activation and kill
probabilities. For instance, a tank might be assigned an 85 percent chance of activating a tilt-
rod mine and, if activation occurs, only a 50 percent chance of actually being killed by the
tilt-rod mine. Each system is assigned unique minefield activation and kill probabilities for
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each mine type that is modeled. Probability assigmnents specific to this thesis are outlined
in Appendix C.
c. Densities
The author designed the minefields in the VSW/SZ such that each of the two
breach lanes in Figure 2 contain approximately 179 mines, giving a combined total of
approximately 358 mines in the VSW/SZ.' Each lane contains approximately 99 magnetic
influence mines, 40 tilt-rod mines, and 40 pressure mines.
5. Bull Breaching Scenario
The Bull Breaching Scenario serves as a benchmark to gauge the relative
effectiveness of the other two scenarios, the Traditional Scenario and the ALUV Scenario.
The Bull Breaching Scenario simulates an amphibious landing through mined littoral zones
without breaching operations being conducted prior to the assault. This scenario should
demonstrate the devastating effect that a minefield can have on a force that proceeds through
a minefield prior to clearing and emphasize the need for effective MCMs. The basic LF used
in all three scenarios is outlined in Reference 1 5 and consists of 23 AAVs (Figure 4), 9
LCACs, and 1 1 LCUs. The AAVs are split into two distinct task forces, the first consisting
of 1 1 AAVs and the second consisting of 12 AAVs. The reference dictates that the LCUs
'The numbers 179 and 358 may seem arbitrary, but they are not. Janus has hard-
coded densities for the minefield emplacement methods selected for this thesis, so the
author used the minimum number of mines that can be represented by three distinct Janus
minefields. Adding 99, 40, and 40 gives 179. Because each scenario requires an ingress








Figure 4. Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV)
will transit the breach lanes only if required. To standardize the three scenarios, the author
has assumed that no LCUs will transit the breach lanes. To eliminate variability and bias in
the movement routes of the basic LF in each scenario, the author preplanned all force
movements in the Bull Breaching Scenario and copied this scenario into the two additional
scenarios.




A defensive force helicopter drops mines in the SZ.
2. Simultaneously, the AAV task forces transit from the ITA to the CLZ through
the mined littoral zone lanes in column formation.
3. The LCACs ingress in column formation from the OTA through lane 1 and
egress to the OTA through lane 2.
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The data generated from this scenario will serve as a baseline for comparative analysis
with the other scenarios of interest. The Bull Breaching Scenario is scenario number 681
within the Janus database.
6. Traditional Scenario
Kernel Blitz 95 served as a test ground for the MCMs used in the Traditional
Scenario. This scenario incorporates a current MCM technique (Figure 5) and a
developmental MCM technique that has not been employed in a real life situation, but
Figure 5. MH-53 in Action
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received positive reviews from Kernel Blitz 95. If a littoral warfare contingency occurred
today, the techniques in this scenario could be fielded in tandem to conduct in stride
breaching operations. Although the Naval Service currently has the MCM capabilities of this
scenario, these two techniques would certainly limit the momentum of the attack and
sacrifice the element of surprise. Perhaps the conclusions drawn from this research will help
to validate or invalidate Kernel Blitz 95 lessons learned as they pertain to the breaching
techniques contained herein.




A defensive force helicopter drops mines in the SZ.
2. Four MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters towing Mk 105 magnetic sweep
hydrofoils transit from the HTA to the VSW to counter the magnetic mine threat
in the VSW. These helicopters return to the HTA after completing their
mission.
3. Two LCACs, one per lane and each containing 12 M-58 line charges (Figure 6),
transit simultaneously from the ITA to the shore breaching a lane in the SZ.
4. Simultaneously, the AAV task forces fransit from the ITA to the CLZ through
the mined littoral zone lanes in column formation.
5. The LCACs ingress in column formation from the OTA through lane 1 and
egress to the OTA through lane 2.





Figure 6. LCAC Firing M-58 Line-Charge
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a. Modeling Systems in Janus
With the exception of the LCACs that contain the M-58 line charges, all
systems introduced in the Bull Breaching Scenario and the Traditional Scenario were
resident within the Janus data base. To learn more about the development of the AAV, the
LCAC, and the MH-53-E with attached Mk 105, see References 14 and 16. The LCACs that
contain the M-58 line charges were developed by simply adding a minefield breaching
capability to the LCAC contained in the data base. The Force File in Janus allowed the
author to add the 12 line charges to the LCAC.
7. ALUV Scenario
To give a one-to-one ratio ofALUVs to mines, the ALUV Scenario pits 358 mines
against 358 ALUVs. Recall that the ingress and the egress lanes each contain 179 mines.
This scenario is of particular mterest because it simulates the MCM that motivates this
research.
The sequence of events for the ALUV Scenario replicate those in the Traditional
Scenario, except events 2 and 3 in the Traditional Scenario are replaced by:
• 1 79 ALUVs transit each lane from the ITA through the VSW/SZ 26 end-to-end
passes before returning to the ITA. Note that those ALUVs that locate mines will
not return to the ITA.
The ALUV Scenario is scenario number 683 within the Janus database.
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a. Modeling theALUV in Janus
In Janus, a system is a platform which carries from zero to fifteen weapons
and is assigned one or more sensors which allow it to acquire enemy systems during combat
simulation execution. A system has a number of characteristics defined in the Combat
Systems Data Base that establish how the system will operate in the simulation (e.g., speed,
weight, carrying capacity, fuel capacity, movement type, etc.). This section will describe the
ALUV in more detail and address the development of the ALUV within the Janus data base.
AnALUV is a battery powered robot that can walk underwater, autonomously
survey a VSW/SZ region, detect mine-like objects, and carry enough explosive to neutralize
a mine. EUiptically shaped and approximately 6.5" wide by 22.5" long by 3" high, it has a
one piece waterproof derlin body and 6 extemally mounted 2-degree-of-freedom legs.
Internal sensors allow the legs to sense obstacles and to walk over them. Pressure sensors
around the body enable the ALUV to sense fluid flow and tilt its body into the flow to
maintain stability.
ALUVs operate without central control and largely independently of one
another. Collectively, they systematically achieve a large scale goal of area search with little
or no interaction. Each ALUV searches independently using inexpensive, on-board sensors
(a compass and a depth sensor). Based on the known bearing perpendicular to the beach, it
walks toward the beach until it reaches a minimum depth, then turns 1 80° and walks out to
a maximum depth and again turns 1 80°. If two ALUVs approach one another, they detect
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each other's presence (by a short range directional acoustic pinger) and veer apart. In this
way, the collection ofALUVs first spread out into a uniformly spaced search pattern, and
then systematically searches the landing zone without unnecessary duplication. [Ref 17]
Because an ALUV walks along the surface of the ocean floor, it could be
modeled best as a Janus amphibious footed dismounted system. To develop the ALUV within
Janus, the author first drew a graphic to represent the system. See Figure 7. Each graphic
can be aggregated to represent more than one ALUV, and a tactical dispersion distance for
Figure 7. Janus Graphic Representation of an ALUV
30

these aggregated systems can be established. To maintain the one-to-one ALUV to mine
ratio, the author aggregated the graphics to represent 358 ALUVs, 1 79 per lane. The tactical
dispersion distance was established as approximately 4.6 meters by using the following




M represents the expected number of mines, fF represents the width of the landing zone,/
represents the ratio ofALUVs to mines, and r represents the tactical dispersion radius that
ALUVs maintain. Recall that the MCMs aim to neutralize 179 mines per lane, so Mis 179.
Also recall that an amphibious force needs a breached lane 50 yards wide to successfully
reach the shore, so WT equals 50 yards, or 45.72 meters. The one-to-one ratio ofALUVs to
mines dictates that/equal 1.
Janus allows a user to interactively use a computer mouse to plan the routes
of systems. Thus, the author preplanned the routes ofeach ALUV during the initial planning
of the ALUV Scenario. To ensure thorough coverage of the two landing lanes, the author
used the same logic that the developers of the ALUV use, according to Reference 1 7. Given
a search width w an ALUV covers as it walks, the landing lane width W, and the number of
ALUVs N, one can use Equation 2 to calculate the fraction of coverage of the width of the
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landing lane in a single end-to-end pass by the ALUVs, and therefore how many passes back
and forth will be needed for thorough coverage:
Fractional Coverage = —*-— ( For — < N) (T^
Considering clearance ofone lane, recall that PF equals 45.72 meters. To maintain the on-to-
one ratio. A'' equals 179. The author determine that 18", or 0.4572 meters was an accurate
figure to use for w. Using these figures, the fractional coverage of one end-to-end pass was
calculated as 1.79 meters. Therefore, approximately 26 end-to-end passes are necessary to
clear the requisite 50 yard lane through the VSW/SZ. Consequently, the routes of the
ALUVs were constructed to include a total of 26 end-to-end passes.
To expedite the time of Janus runs, the author established a maximum movement
speed of 45 kilometers per hour. Entries were made in the data base to reflect an ALUV's
23 pound weight (inclusive of its 7 payload pound carrying capacity), its previously
mentioned dimensions, its 1 1 5 cubic foot volume, its footed movement type, and its ability
to operate amphibiously.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has described the scenarios and amplified their development. Chapter





Statistics is the art ofmaking numerical conjectures about questions of interest. As
a stochastic simulation, Janus becomes a useful and economic statistical tool from which to
obtain data to begin to answer some of the difficult questions posed by those interested in
combat analysis. Ultimately, the author of this thesis seeks to conjecture about the tactical
effectiveness of the ALUV as a MCM in the VSW/SZ relative to current Naval Service
MCM capabilities for hunting and neutralizing mines in these regions.
This chapter provides a statistical analysis of the data obtained from the Janus
scenario runs. Following this overview, a discussion of the run sample size derivation
precedes a section that presents a nonparametric statistical test to determine which, if any,
MCM is best. These two sections assume that the reader is familiar with probability and
statistics. Readers who lack this mathematical experience can skip these two sections
without losing an appreciation ofthe inferences drawn from the data. The concluding section
introduces specific measures of effectiveness (MOEs) which are used as bases for analysis
of the data. The data displayed in this concluding section has often been summarized to
provided succinct appealing graphs. Appendix D contains a more detailed display ofthe data
extracted from Janus. It also includes summary statistics.
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B. HOW MANY SCENARIO RUNS?
It is desirable to select a sample size that minimizes the detection of unimportant
effects and maximizes the detection of important effects, while retaining the true
characteristics of the underlying distribution of the data. The author faced this challenge
when determining an appropriate number of scenario runs to simulate.
As mentioned earlier, Janus is a stochastic system that determines the result ofactions
like detections or minefield crossing events according to the laws of probability and chance.
While it is highly unlikely, the interplay of probabilities could possibly generate an
occurrence that is unrepresentative ofwhat would actually happen in reality. The rarity of
such occurrences probably supersede one in ten thousand Janus runs. But the author, to be
conservative, has assumed that they occur more frequently, one in one hundred Janus runs.
These runs could be considered failed Janus runs. By characterizing the successful Janus
runs as a proportion, the author used statistical methods to obtain the number of runs
necessary to fit the criteria delineated in the previous paragraph.
Ifwe assume that failures occur at a rate of one in one hundred, successes occur at
a rate ofninety-nine in one hundred. This proportion of success,/;, represents the probability
of a successful run. Consequently,/; =-??- = 0.99.
As with all experiments, the researcher must determine the precision and confidence
level desired of the results. In an effort to keep the number of runs at a reasonable level with
minimal sacrifice of precision and confidence, the author set both levels to 95%. Since the
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precision level is 95%, the maximum expected error, E, is 5%. From probability and
statistics, it is known that a (1-a) confidence interval gives an upper and a lower value
between whichp can expect to fall 100(1- a )% of the time. Since our confidence level is
given as 95%, a decimal representation of a can be obtained. Hence, (1 - a ) = 0.95 implies
that a = 0.05. The Central Limit Theorem implies that a random sample of the successful
runs is approximately standard normal when the sample size is sufficiently large. Using the
values of/?, E, and a , and the table for the probabilities of a standard normal distribution,
the author used Equation 3 [Ref 1 8, page 240] to estimate n, the required number of scenario
runs:
„ = il^iLZlhEl (3)
(1.96)^ 0.99 (1- 0.99)
0.05'
15.21
Rounding 15.21 up to the nearest integer gives a required number of 16 scenario runs to
simulate.
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C. A NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICAL TEST OF LANDING FORCE KILLS
Very often in practice researchers make decisions about populations (groups of data)
on the basis of sample information. In attempting to reach such decisions, it is useful to
make assertions (or guesses) about the populations involved. Such assertions, which may
or may not be true, are called statistical hypotheses. They are general statements about the
probability distribution of the underlying population. In many instances, a researcher
formulates a statistical hypothesis for the sole purpose of rejecting it.
If a particular hypothesis is true but the results observed in a random sample differ
markedly from the results expected under the hypothesis, then the observed differences are
significant and inclination would suggest rejecting the hypothesis. Procedures that enable
a researcher to determine whether observed samples differ significantly from the results
expected, and thus help the researcher to decide whether to accept or reject the hypothesis,
are called tests of hypotheses or tests of significance. Most tests of hypotheses and
significance (or decision rules) require various assumptions about the distribution of the
population from which the samples were drawn. But situations arise in practice in which
such assumptions may not be justified or in which there is doubt they apply. Consequently,
statisticians have devised various tests and methods that are independent of population
distributions and associated parameters. These are called nonparametric tests.
Since the observed samples from the scenarios have unknown distributions, the
author employs the Mann-Whitney U Test, a nonparametric test which can be used to
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evaluate two independent samples to determine which population mean exceeds the other.
This test is conducted by ranking the observed values and analyzing the ranks instead of the
original data. In an interrogative sense the author seeks three answers:
1
.
Is Bull Breaching a more effective MCM than Traditional Breaching?
2. Is Bull Breaching a more effective MCM than ALUV Breaching?
3. Is Traditional Breaching a more effective MCM than ALUV Breaching?
Translating to statistical hypotheses gives a null hypothesis:
Hq. Population mean ofMCM 1 = Population mean ofMCM 2
The null hypothesis is tested against three distinct alternative hypotheses, using LF kills per
scenario as a measure:
Hyij-. Population mean of Bull Breaching (MCM 1) > Population mean of
Traditional Breaching (MCM 2)
H^2'- Population mean of Bull Breaching (MCM 1) > Population mean ofALUV
Breaching (MCM 2)
H^j'. Population mean of Traditional Breaching (MCM 1) > Population mean of
ALUV Breaching (MCM 2)
Recall now that 32 landing craft comprise the LF, 23 AAVs and 9 LCACs. A cursory
look at the data via Figure 8 suggests that the null hypothesis will indeed be rejected in each









Figure 8. LF Kills by Scenario (by run)
Now we examine the test to see if it supports the assertion that the null hypothesis will
be rejected. The null hypothesis will be rejected at the significance level « = 0.05 only if the
observed value ofU is less than or equal to the critical value of 83 (obtained from the Table
of Critical Values ofMann-Whitney U in Reference 19).
1. Hq verses H^i
Table 1 contains the results of the Mann-Whitney U Test for this case. The author




Level Sample Size Ranked Sum Ranked Mean LF Kills
BuU 16 389 24.3125
Traditional 16 139 8.6875
Observed U Prob > U (p-value)
3 < 0.0001
Table 1. Mann-Whitney U Test ofHo verses H^,
3 is much less than 83 and the ranked mean LF kills of the Bull Breaching Scenario exceed
that of the Traditional Scenario, Hq is rejected and H^; is assumed. Note the p-value in the
table. A p-value is the probability ofbeing wrong ifan effect is declared non-null. This small
p-value indicates that the author can conclude with reasonable certainty that, relative to LF
Kills, Traditional Breaching is a more effective MCM than Bull Breaching.
2. Hq verses H^2
Table 2 contains the results of the Mann-Whitney U Test for this case. The author
used the ranked sums and the sample sizes to calculate an observed U statistic of zero.
Incidentally, a U Statistic of zero indicates that no rank in the lower ranking group exceeds
any ranks in the higher ranking group. Figure 1 justifies this statement. Since zero is much
less than 83 and the ranked mean LF kills of the Bull Breaching Scenario exceed that ofthe
ALUY Scenario, Hq is rejected and H^2 is assumed. Note the p-value in the table. This small
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p-value indicates that the author can conclude with reasonable certainty that, relative to LF








Ranked Sum Ranked Mean T F Kills
136 8.5
392 24.5
Observed U Prob > U (p-value)
< 0.0001
Table 2. Mann-Whitney U Test ofHo verses H A^2
3. Hq verses H^^
Table 3 contains the results of the Mann-Whitney U Test for this case. The author
used the ranked sums and the sample sizes to calculate an observed U statistic of 7.5. Since
7.5 is much less than 83 and the ranked mean LF kills of the Traditional Scenario exceed that
Mann-Whitnev U Test
Level Sample Size Ranked Sum Ranked Mean LF Kills
ALUV 16 143.5 8.9688
Traditional 16 384.5 24.0313
Observed U Prob > U Cp-value)
7.5 < 0.0001
Table 3. Mann-Whitney U Test ofHq verses H A^3
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of the ALUV Scenario, Hq is rejected and H^^ is assumed. Note the p-value in the table. This
small p-value indicates that the author can conclude with reasonable certainty that, relative
to LF Kills, ALUV Breaching is a more effective MCM than Traditional Breaching.
D. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOEs)
1. Landing Force Kills
Recall again that 32 landing craft comprise the LF, 23 AAVs and 9 LCACs. Figure







IMGM HT-RM nPM nTotal
Figure 9. Average LF Kills by Mine Type (by scenario)
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scenario. The figure reveals that PMs had the greatest eflfect on the LF in the ALUV
Scenario, although not by much. MGMs, T-RMs, and PMs respectively accounted for 1 .37,
1.13, and 3.5 of the total average of 6 LF kills in the ALUV Scenario. PMs also had the
greatest efifect on the LF in the Traditional Scenario, this time by a larger margin. MGMs,
T-RMs, and PMs respectively accounted for 2.3, 2.8, and 7.45 of the total average of 12.55
LF kills in the Traditional Scenario. The Bull Breaching Scenario had a fairly even dispersion
of kills between the three mine types. MGMs, T-RMs, and PMs respectively accounted for
7.2, 6.6, and 6.8 of the total average of 20.6 LF kills in the Bull Breaching Scenario.
When comparing the three scenarios, it becomes evident that the total average number
ofLF kills in the Bull Breaching Scenario exceed the total average number ofLF kills in the
Traditional Scenario. And the total average number of LF kills in the Traditional Scenario
exceed the total average number ofLF kills in the ALUV Scenario. Furthermore, the same
result holds when comparing the number of LF kills induced by each mine type, with one
exception. PM kills when comparing the Bull Breaching Scenario and the Traditional
Scenario provides the exception. One may wonder why the number of PM kills is
approximately equal in these two scenarios. In three of the sixteen Traditional Scenario runs,
the MCM assets did not make it to the SZ to clear a lane for the LF. These assets were killed
by MGMs in the VSW. Additionally, when the SZ MGMs of the Traditional Scenario did
make it to the SZ to perform their mission, many were rendered ineffective at the hands of
T-RMs. Resultingly, these assets never cleared a lane through PMs. These results indicate,
as in the real life case, that the SZ still poses a formidable challenge for traditional MCM
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assets. This comparative analysis suggests that ALUVs are the best MCM, followed by
traditional MCMs.
2. Cost Analysis
Operational demands on today's military forces have continued to increase while
financial resources allocated to the Department of Defense have steadily declined. Military
fiscal planners anticipate that these trends wiJl continue in the near future. Consequently,
military personnel responsible for procuring weapons and systems have difficult choices to
make. Cost is one significant factor that is considered in the procurement process.
By considering the actual cost of each AAV and LCAC in the LF and the difference
in the LF kill rates between scenarios, the author generated data which depicts the
approximate fiscal savings (Figure 1 0) when employing one MCM vice another. These dollar
figures include the total cost of landing craft losses incurred, but omit the operational costs
incurred from conducting each MCM technique. An analysis of the operational costs is
beyond the scope ofthis thesis. Realize also that the actual fiscal savings may differ when the
size and composition of the LF change. But the general conclusion is that there is a fiscal
savings when employing: Traditional MCMs vice Bull Breaching, ALUV MCMs vice Bull
Breaching, or ALUV MCMs vice Traditional MCMs.
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Figure 10. Fiscal Savings (in millions) when Employing one MCM vice Another
(Includes Total Cost of Landing Craft Losses, Not Operational Costs)
One LCAC costs twenty-seven million dollars [Ref. 20]. One AAV costs 2.5 million
dollars [Ref. 21]. The Janus data indicates that on average the BuU Breaching, Traditional,
and ALUV scenarios respectively sustained 14.5, 9.19, and 4.63 AAV kills. The BuU
Breaching, Traditional, and ALUV scenarios also respectively sustained 6.125, 3.375, and
1.375 LCAC kills. By using these numbers to take the difference in AAV kills between
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scenarios and the difference in LCAC kills between scenarios, the results in Table 4 were
obtained. Note that any fractional portion was rounded to the next higher integer. The
author used the numbers contained in Table 4 and the respective costs ofAAVs and LCACs
to produce Figure 10.
Number Of Landing Craft Saved when Employing Differing MCMs
Landing Craft Traditional vice
BuU
ALUV vice BuU ALUV vice
Traditional
AAV 6 10 5
LCAC 3 5 2
Table 4. Number of Landing Craft Saved when Employing one MCM vice Another
This cost analysis suggests that ALUVs are the most cost effective MCM relative to
costs incurred from landing craft losses. Furthermore, the developers of the ALUV project
that the cost of each ALUV will be less than $1,000, a dollar figure that is significantly less
than the 27 milHon doUar cost ofjust one LCAC configured for MCMs.
3. Combat Power Ashore
Figure 1 1 diagrams the percentage of combat power to reach the shore by scenario.










Figure 11. Average Percentage of Combat Power Ashore by Scenario
To develop this diagram, the author calculated the mean average of the number of
surviving landing craft for each scenario. Note that each LCAC had two opportunities to be
killed, inbound or outbound. If the LCAC survived its inbound journey, it was able to offload
its contents at the landing site and thus is included in the calculations contained in this
diagram. The outbound fate ofLCACs provides no information for these calculations. AAVs
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transit the mined landing craft lanes only once, so they project combat power ashore only if
they survive their single transit to the shore.
The results of this MOE suggest that ALUVs are approximately 20% more effective
than the traditional method of clearing a mined landing lane. The fact that only 45% of the
force reached the shore in the Bull Breaching Scenario emphasizes the urgent need for
effective MCMs in the VSW/SZ.
4. Mines Neutralized in the ALUV Scenario
On average, approximately 341 of the possible 358 mines were neutralized in the
ALUV Scenario. In other words, the ALUVs cleared approximately 95% of the mines
present in the minefields. Recall that a one-to-one ALUV-to-mine ratio was used in this
experiment. If this ratio is increased, the clearance rate of the ALUVs will probably increase
also.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has provided a detailed analysis of the data extracted from Janus at the
completion of all simulation runs. The following chapter will summarize the results of this





In purpose this thesis has sought to evaluate the tactical effectiveness of the
Autonomous Legged Underwater Vehicle (ALUV) as a mine countemieasure (MCM) in the
very shallow water and the surf zone relative to current Naval Service capabilities for
hunting and neutralizing mines in these regions. With the aid ofthe Janus combat simulation
computer model, the author developed three scenarios which focused on highlighting the
differences in effectiveness of bulling a landing force through a mined landing zone, landing
a force through a mined landing zone after employing current or "traditional" MCM
methods, and landing a force through a mined landing zone after employing ALUVs as a
MCM. The scenarios were identical, other than theMCM method employed. The traditional
MCMs comprised four MH-53s towing Mk-105 hydrofoils to counter the very shallow water
mine threat and two LCACs with twelve line-charges mounted on each to counter the surf
zone threat. The Kernel Blitz 95 exercise guided the development of the scenarios and
provided the composition of the landing force, 23 Amphibious Assault Vehicles and 9
Landing Craft Air Cushioned. To concentrate the modeling effort on the analysis ofMCMs,
the author assumed that the amphibious landing force encounter no opposing enemy fire.
Using statistical methods, the author determined that sixteen runs of each scenario
was sufficient to glean the information required of this research with minimal sacrifice of
precision and confidence. A nonparametric statistical method was used to compare the three
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Is Bull Breaching a more effective MCM than Traditional Breaching?
2. Is Bull Breaching a more effective MCM than ALUV Breaching?
3. Is Traditional Breaching a more effective MCM than ALUV Breaching?
The answer to each of these questions was no.
The author then focused on four measures of effectiveness: landing force kills by
scenario and by mine type, total cost of landing craft losses, combat power ashore, and
percentage of mines neutralized in the ALUV Scenario. Landing force kills by scenario
revealed that the ALUV Scenario suffered an average of six kills, while the Traditional and
Bull Breaching Scenarios respectively suffered an average of approximately 13 and 21 kills.
Pressure mines proved most lethal in the ALUV and Traditional Scenarios, while the Bull
Breaching Scenario saw a fairly even distribution of kills among the three mine types:
pressure mines, tilt-rod mines, and magnetic influence mines. The cost analysis suggested
that there is a fiscal savings when employing: Traditional MCMs vice Bull Breaching,
ALUV MCMs vice Bull Breaching, or ALUV MCMs vice Traditional MCMs. The combat
power ashore study showed that on average 85% of the ALUV Scenario landing force safely
made it ashore, while the average percentage of combat power ashore in the Traditional and
Bull Breaching Scenarios was 66% and 45%, respectively. Finally, with a one-to-one
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ALUV-to-mine ratio, the ALUVs cleared an average of 95% of the mines present in the
minefields.
B. RECOMMENDATION
This study indicates that ALUVs, as modeled, counter mines more effectively than
current countermeasures employed in the VSW/SZ. This conclusion is drawn with the
understanding that modeling and simulation is a tool that has strenghts and limitations. Its
limitations lie in its inability to re-create actual physical conditions and the "fog" of war; its
is not a panacea. It is, however, a valuable tool useful for gaining insight into many of the
questions that puzzle those interested or involved in combat analysis. With these thoughts
in mind, the author feels confident that the Naval Service should vigorously explore ALUVs
as a possible solution to the VSW/SZ mine countermeasure problem.
51
52
APPENDIX A. LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AAV amphibious assault vehicle LCAC
ALUV autonomous legged underwater LCU
vehicles LF
AOA amphibious objective area
C
LCD
CLA craft landing area M
CLZ craft landing zone M-58
E MCM
E error, expected maximum MDA
F MECH-1




























mine clearing line charge
mine countermeasure
mine danger area












oOMFTS operational maneuver from the sea
OTA outer transport area
OTH over-the-horizon
P
P proportion of success
PM pressure mine
R








VSW very shallow water
W
w width, ALUV search
W width, landing lane
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APPENDIX B. JANUS SCENARIO IMAGES
This appendix contains selected images captured from actual Janus scenario runs.
The images are arranged in chronological order, with general setup images presented first,
followed by Bull Breaching Scenario images, Traditional Scenario images, and finally
ALUV Scenario images. A brief explanation of each image is included below.
GENERAL SCENARIO IMAGES
Figure Bl. Panoramic View ofAmphibious Objective Area off the Coast of Red Beach
Figure B2. Close-up View of Mine Danger Area (MDA)
Figure B3. Red Force Helicopter Laying Pressure Mines in the SZ
Figure B4. AAV Task Forces in the ITA with Routes Shown
Figure B5. LCAC Task Force Approaching the Ingress Lane of the Mine Danger Area.
The Egress Lane is Clearly Displayed.
BULL SCENARIO IMAGES
Figure B6. Overview of Landing Force Prior to the Amphibious Assault
Figure B7. LCACs Approaching the Mine Danger Area After 1 5 of 23 AAV Kills
Figure B8. Two LCACs Return to the OTA After 7 of 9 LCAC Kills
TRADITIONAL SCENARIO IMAGES
Figure B9. Overview of Landing Force Prior to the Amphibious Assault. Note the MH-
53s in the HTA and the Two LCACs with Mounted Line-Charges in the ITA.
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Figure BIO. Four MH-53 with Mk-105 Magnetic Sweep Gear Clearing a Lane in the
VSW
Figure Bl 1. Two LCACs with Mounted Line-Charges Approach the VSW as the MH-53s
Return to the HTA
ALUVSCENARIO IMAGES
Figure B12. 358 ALUVs in the ITA Prior to Clearing Operations
Figure B13. 358 ALUVs in the ITA Prior to Clearing Operations with Routes Shown
Figure B14. LCACs Approaching the Mine Danger Area After Only 3 of 23 AAV Kills
and 95% ALUV Clearance
Figure B15. Two LCACs Return to the OTA After Only 2 of 9 LCAC Kills
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Figure B2. Close-up View of Mine Danger Area (MDA)
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Figure B3. Red Force Helicopter Laying Pressure Mines in the SZ
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Figure B4. AAV Task Forces in the ITA with Routes Shown
60

Figure B5. LCAC Task Force Approaching the Ingress Lane of the Mine Danger
Area. The Egress Lane is Clearly Displayed.
61

Figure B6. Overview of Landing Force Prior to the Amphibious Assault
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Figure B7. LCACs Approaching the Mine Danger Area After 15 of 23 AAV Kills
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Figure B8. Two LCACs Return to the OTA After 7 of 9 LCAC Kills
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Figure B9. Overview of Landing Force Prior to the Amphibious Assault. Note the








Figure Bll. Two LCACs with Mounted Line-Charges Approach the VSW as the
MH-53S Return to the HTA
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Figure B12. 358 ALUVs in the ITA Prior to Clearing Operations
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APPENDIX C. MODELING SYSTEM PROBABILITIES
This appendix contains information on the reliability and survivability probabilities of
each breaching asset, the landing craft mine activation and kill probabilities, and the dud
probabilities of each mine type.
Each breaching asset is assigned a probability (reliability) that it will successfully
neutralize each mine type it encounters, and a probability (survivability) that if it encounters
a given mine type that it wiU survive that encounter. Table CI contains reliability (R) and
survivability (S) probabilities.
















Table CI. Reliability/Survivability Probabilities for Traditional Breaching Assets.
The Star (*) Represents the Fact that Once a Line Charge is Expended, it
Cannot be Reused. Probabilities Expressed as Percentages.
Each landing craft is assigned a probabUity (activation) that it will activate a given
mine type if such a mine is encounter, and a probability (kill) that, if activation occurs, the
particular landing craft will be killed. Table C2 contains activation (A) and kill (K)
probabilities for each landing craft.
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Mine Activation and Kill Probabilities







AAV 70/40 75/60 75/65
LCAC 60/30 50/50 70/50
Table C2. Mine Activation and Kill Probabilities ( Expressed as Percentages)
Finally, Table C3 contains the probability that each mine type will fail to activate if
encountered by a breaching asset or a landing craft (dud probability).
Mine Dud Probabilities
Mine Type Dud Probability
Magnetic Influence Mine 4
Tilt-Rod Mine 3
Pressure Mine 4
Table C3. Mine Dud Probabilities (Expressed as Percentages)
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APPENDIX D. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
This appendix contains a detailed listing of the data collected from the Janus combat
simulation runs in Tables D2, D3, and D4. It also contains summary statistics of this data.
Table Dl lists the summary statistics.
Total LF Kills Total LF Killed bv MGM
Bull Traditional ALUV Bull Traditional ALUV
Mean 20.6 12.6 6 Mean 7.19 2.31 1.38
Median 20 12.5 5.5 Median 8 2.5 1
Variance 7.58 7.33 4.93 Variance 4.43 2.5 1.58
Total AAV Kills Total LF KiUed bv T-RM
Bull Traditional ALUV Bull Traditional ALUV
Mean 14.5 9.19 4.63 Mean 6.63 2.81 1.13
Median 14 9 4 Median 7 3 1
Variance 5.6 2.83 3.18 Variance 4.52 3.36 1.32
Total LCAC Kills Total LF Killed bv PM
Bull Traditional ALUV Bull Traditional ALUV
Mean 6.125 3.375 1.375 Mean 6.8 7.4 3.5
Median 6 3.5 1 Median 7 7 3
Variance 3.45 2.917 0.917 Variance 3.4 4 4
Total ALUV/Mine Kills
Mean Median Variance
ALUV Scenario 341.81 343.5 17.76
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